By Levi Yisroel Brackman – In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in Hebrew and Jewish Studies at University College London
Introduction
There is a view commonly held among scholars that the Maimonidean rationalist approach to religion is incompatible with traditional practice.[1] This dissertation will contest that view, arguing that not only is the rationalist approach compatible with traditional practice but, more importantly, its methods have actually informed traditional religious practice. The test case of this dissertation is prayer. In the first part of the dissertation I will try to show that Maimonides’ view of prayer can inform traditional religious practice.
In order to do this, we must first establish whether Maimonides has a traditional view of prayer. Does he see utility in petitionary prayer? Or does he not believe in petitionary prayer at all, preferring instead a form of contemplative worship?
Scholars are divided on this question. Some scholars, such as Alvin J. Reines in an article entitled “Maimonides’ True Belief concerning G-d: A Systematisation”,[2] argue that Maimonides’ view of petitionary prayer in The Code contradicts his contemplative view of prayer found in The Guide to the Perplexed, and conclude that Maimonides did not see any utility in petitionary prayer. Others, such as David Hartman in his book Maimonides, Torah and Philosophic Quest[3] and Ehud Benor in Worship of the Heart,[4] see the two views as complementary. In the present analysis I will argue that Benor’s compatibilist view of Maimonides’ concept of prayer is the more convincing and therefore that Maimonides’ view of prayer has within it the essential traditional component of petition and can influence traditional practice.
In the second part of the dissertation I hope to prove that Maimonides’ view of prayer actually had a profound influence on the traditional practice of Habad Hasidic prayer. In support of this argument, I will show that David Blumenthal’s portrayal of Maimonides’ three stages of true spiritual life[5] matches and augments Benor’s interpretation of Maimonides. I will then adduce the striking similarities between Benor’s and Blumenthal’s description of Maimonides’ view on worship and the Habad view of prayer and argue that not only is Maimonides’ view of prayer, as found in both The Guide and The Code, compatible with traditional religious practice but that it is also influenced Habad’s idea of prayer.
Part One
Several scholars contend that Maimonides’ view of prayer in The Guide is blatantly incompatible with the view found in The Code, on the grounds that his negative theology, as found in The Guide, is incompatible with petitionary prayer. His negative theology contends that no real positive attribute can be predicated of G-d. In Maimonides’ words:
In view of the fact that the relation between us and Him, may He be exalted, is considered nonexistent – I mean the relation between He and that which is other than He – it follows necessarily that likeness between Him and us should also be considered nonexistent.[6]
As far as Maimonides is concerned, any attribute that is predicated of G-d, for example knowledge, is a homonym, thus G-d’s knowledge has absolutely no relation to human knowledge. Even the fact the G-d exists means nothing to us because the way He exists is not in any way similar to the way humans exist. In fact, Maimonides thinks that the best way to define G-d is by not defining Him.
For He may He be exalted, has no causes anterior to Him that are the cause of His existence and by which, in consequence, He is defined. For this reason it is well known among people who engage in speculation, who understand what they say, that G-d cannot be defined.[7]
Alvin Reines thinks Maimonides’ negative attribute theology implies an “absolute transcendence” concept of deity, meaning that G-d is completely beyond any type of definition; thus one cannot even predicate knowledge of G-d. He argues that although there may be some hints in Maimonides’ writing of a “qualified transcendence” concept of the deity, such that G-d can be defined at least by his attributes, for example G-d knows all happenings,[8] Maimonides’ true belief is that G-d is absolutely transcendent. Reines therefore concludes that Maimonides truthfully did not believe in petitionary and thankful prayer:
Moreover, the fact that G-d has no relations with any being other than Himself, and can be affected by no other means, for example, that when humans pray they do not encounter G-d, or enter any other relation with Him, and their prayers produce no effect on Him.[9]
Reines asks whether Maimonides offers a form of religious practice for those who believe in the “absolute transcendence” view of the deity. He contends that any practice that would be suitable for such a person would be devoid of any experiential worship such as prayer. He therefore says that Maimonides believed that the true way of serving G-d was by intellectual meditation. To support this view he quotes Maimonides in The Guide:
At that time this would have been similar to the appearance of a prophet in these times who, calling upon the people to worship G-d, would say: “G-d has given a law forbidding you to pray to Him, to fast, to call Him for help in misfortune. Your worship should consist solely in meditation without any works at all.”[10]
According to Reines, “it requires little imagination … to recognize Maimonides as the latter-day prophet”[11] mentioned in this paragraph, awakening people to a truer mode of worship. Thus Reines comes to the clear conclusion that Maimonides did not really believe in traditional prayer.[12]
There are others, however, who accept the quoted paragraph from The Guide (III: 32) concerning sacrifices as proof that Maimonides saw a utility in petitionary prayer. Marvin Fox, for example, in his book Interpreting Maimonides,[13] claims that petitionary prayer gives the individual who prays an awareness of G-d’s power in nature, making him or her aware that all that happens comes from G-d, and resisting the belief that things are governed by chance.[14]
Thus, prayer inculcates in the person correct beliefs and opinions. Fox maintains, however, that once prayer has done its job and the person has already achieved the correct beliefs and opinions, s/he should dedicate him/herself to seeking the intellectual knowledge of G-d:
Ideally then we must move from ordinary prayer and ordinary fulfilment of commandments to the only life in which man is finally redeemed, the life in which he elevates himself to G-d and is connected with Him permanently by way of the intellect.[15]
Thus, Fox is saying that there comes a time in the life of the philosopher when petitionary prayer is obsolete. However, he does not draw the same conclusions from this as Reines did; rather, he says that Maimonides felt that, in truth, petitionary prayer should exist alongside contemplative worship. Fox quotes The Guide to explain this paradoxical conclusion:[16]
The end of these actions pertaining to divine service is the constant commemoration of G-d, the love of Him and the fear of Him, the obligatory observance of the commandments in general, and the bringing-about of such belief concerning Him, may He be exalted, as is necessary for everyone [my emphasis] professing the law.[17]
From this Fox concludes that, according to Maimonides, there are some things that everyone must adhere to, even the philosopher, and prayer is one of these things. This is because the human is made up of more than just the intellect and as such is inherently deficient and therefore unable to fully grasp G-d without the aid of language. The only natural way for the human, including the philosopher, to communicate to G-d is through petitionary and thankful prayer:
The ideal praise of G-d may well be, as Maimonides suggests, the wordless praise of the spheres, but how can this ideal ever be realized in actual human lives? Our apprehension is imperfect at best, and our dependence on language is deep. We cannot conceptualize without language, although we are fully aware that our conceptions are defective and our language inaccurate in respect to G-d.[18]
The problem with Fox’s understanding of Maimonides’ view of petitionary prayer is that it sits uneasily with Maimonides’ overall transcendent philosophy of G-d, in which G-d cannot be petitioned. Fox says that although petitionary prayer is really antipathetic to the philosophic mind, Maimonides was nonetheless forced to allow it because humans are unable truly to communicate with G-d any other way.[19] Thus, we end up with an absurd situation in which philosophers are forced to worship G-d using an anthropomorphic liturgy that is wholly incompatible with their transcendent notion of G-d. Indeed, Oliver Leaman in Moses Maimonides,[20] makes exactly this point:
This is all very well but it still leaves the philosopher in something of a quandary, since he has reached a level of understanding of the deity which not only makes the language of prayer unnecessary but even inimical to the highest degree of understanding. The very language which is designed to attract the community as a whole is positively repugnant to the philosopher.[21]
To deal with this problem Leaman maintains that for the philosopher petitionary prayer acts as a safety net. Prayer helps the person focus on G-d. Humans are constantly involved in everyday mundane activities and need to be trained to focus on things that are beyond the mundane. Thus, petitionary prayer causes the one who prays to see the universe from its correct standpoint. This is not only necessary for the masses but it is important for the philosopher as well:
It requires constant effort to concentrate totally upon G-d and his works when praying, and it requires a continuing effort to change our dispositions and actions in order to make them more appropriate from a religious point of view. Even those who have achieved some success in that direction cannot rest on their laurels and abandon the practice which led them to their present state of consciousness.[22]
Leaman then goes on to explain that Maimonides sees the Laws of the Torah in this way too. All the laws are there to help the human arrive at correct opinions. For the philosopher, however, the attainment of correct opinions does not suffice: s/he actually tries to understand why those opinions are deemed to be correct, and this understanding will ultimately lead to the highest form of moral perfection.[23] Leaman says this is in harmony with Maimonides’ view that the whole intellectual process ultimately leads to moral perfection. So although undoubtedly Maimonides sees intellectual activity to be superior to moral perfection, the two are nonetheless intimately linked:
This is an important idea which illustrates the reconciliation of the notion of intellectual with moral perfection. The perfected person concentrates upon the nature of G-d, and as a result performs morally virtuous actions. This is hardly surprising, since the only knowledge we can have of G-d’s nature is through His actions, and in so far as these exhibit grace, love and providence the perfected intellect will seek to imitate these.[24]
To substantiate this argument Leaman quotes from the end of Maimonides’ The Guide:
It is clear that the perfection of man that may truly be glorified is the one acquired by he who has achieved, in a measure corresponding to his capacity, apprehension of Him, may He be exalted, and who knows His providence extending over His creatures as manifested in the act of bringing them into being and in their governance as it is. The way of life of such an individual, after he has achieved this apprehension, will always have a view of loving-kindness, righteousness and judgment, through assimilation to His actions.[25]
In Maimonides’ thinking, intellectual perfection and moral perfection go hand in hand. The study of the reasons for the law is as important to Maimonides’ system as the study of physics and metaphysics.[26] Leaman explains that Maimonides understood that the human being is slow to change and needs to be constantly trained into perfection. The study of the reasons for the laws compels the person to carry out the law; the law in turn trains the person into correct opinions. If for some reason one stops studying the reasons for the law one can revert to previous instincts.[27] The law thus exists to inculcate the correct disposition to act in a virtuous manner.
This is also, according to Leaman, the rationale behind Maimonides’ need for both petitionary prayer and contemplative prayer. Petitionary prayer helps the person focus on G-d. Ceasing petitionary prayer might make even the philosopher fall back into mundane concerns and diminish his ability to maintain a focus on higher concerns – namely G-d.
There seems, however, to be something fundamentally illogical in Leaman’s main contention that “a practice like prayer which is frequently performed may help in turning our minds into religious as opposed to ordinary concerns.”[28] As Ehud Benor points out, for the philosopher who has a most perfect transcendent concept of G-d, petitionary prayer for mundane concerns would serve to distract from much more lofty endeavours.[29] Benor further challenges Leaman’s assertion that knowledge of G-d’s actions will lead to moral action and asks two pointed questions:
How can we know that people who understand the world – who know the wisdom that determines that it be as it is, that from G-d’s point of view everything is very good – will be motivated to act upon it? Do we have any reason to believe that according to Maimonides objective scientific inquiry can reveal a natural moral order?[30]
Benor claims that Leaman does not appreciate the seriousness of the Aristotelian dichotomy between intellectual perfection and practical excellence. Benor contends that, as long as one is contemplating abstract ideas of G-d such as the Unmoved Mover, one certainly will not be motivated towards practical moral excellence because the thought is pure consciousness with no practical implications at all.[31] However, Benor agrees that by contemplating the moral nature of G-d one approaches a solution to the intellectual-versus-moral dichotomy. Indeed, that is something that Leaman himself contends:
This is not as strange as it may seem, since that level of perfection includes an intimate knowledge of G-d’s works in the world, and these are heavily mediated by moral notions such as love, righteousness and justice. A human cannot observe the moral character of such actions and not seek to emulate them.[32]
Benor, however, expands on this idea: according to Maimonides, G-d is the intellect as well as the intellectually cognising subject and the intellectually cognised object,[33] and Maimonides uses the human intellect to illustrate this.[34] Shlomo Pines argues that Maimonides intentionally related G-d’s intellect to human intellect. Benor understands this to mean that we should see G-d’s knowledge “as extending to the general structure of nature”.[35] We should think of G-d as constantly cognising the make-up of the universe. He is quick to add that there is of course no connection between human cognition and G-d’s; we view the universe as something that both humans and G-d cognise, albeit in infinitely differing ways. Furthermore, Benor argues that since Maimonides allows G-d to be called “Creator” one can form a view of G-d that reflects an understanding of divine will and wisdom that exists in the world. Thus, if G-d is the Creator who is constantly cognising the universe and His cognition and Himself are one, then by understanding the structure of nature, one can have an appreciation of G-d Himself.[36]
As proof, Benor adduces The Guide, where Maimonides says that by understanding the world one can come to love G-d:
This G-d, honoured and revered, it is our duty to love and fear; as it is said, “You shall love the L-rd your G-d” (Deut. 6:5), and it further said, “You shall fear the L-rd your G-d” (ibid. 6:13). And what is the way that will lead to the love of Him and the fear of Him? When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works and creatures and from them obtains a glimpse of His wisdom which is incomparable and infinite, he will straightaway love Him, praise Him, glorify Him, and long with an exceeding longing to know His great name;even as David said, “My soul thirsts for G-d, for the living G-d (Ps. 42:3). (Mishneh Torah, “The Basic Principles of the Torah”, Chapter 2) [Benor’s emphasis]
Benor draws from this that there can be human knowledge of G-d, which comes from knowing and understanding His universe and its structure of nature. Benor then goes on to discuss Maimonides’ view of Moses’ attainment of divine knowledge. He makes much of the fact that Maimonides asserts that Moses initially asked G-d to know His essence, and when this was denied he asked to know the attributes through which he would know G-d. This request was granted.[37] By comprehending G-d’s attributes Moses was able to reach the highest apprehension of G-d possible to humans. In Benor’s words:
An idea of G-d constructed out of attributes of action, attributes that are only allegorically applicable to G-d, is indeed presented as the highest idea of G-d that we can form.[38]
For Maimonides, the knowledge of G-d’s attributes, that is, the structure of the nature of the universe, brings one to the highest form of knowledge of G-d. From this Benor seeks to prove that petitionary prayer is not so far removed from the general thoughts of the philosopher. If the philosopher’s general contemplation revolves around the natural structure of the universe, then it is compatible with a liturgy that also focuses on worldly concerns. Knowledge of the structure of the universe and, by extension, knowledge of G-d awakens the morally excellent person’s innate virtuous behaviour:
The philosopher is a good person whose character has been finely tuned to respond with proper emotion and action as the situation requires. This response can be repressed by contemplative absorption that renders the practical virtues inactive, but the intellectual demands of the love of G-d reactivate it. The result is that the virtuous character of the philosopher reasserts itself as the intellect is passionately drawn towards G-d.[39]
Thus, contemplation on the structure of the universe reawakens the philosopher’s virtuous character and petitionary prayer for practical needs plays a role in directing the reasserted virtuous character of the philosopher back towards practical commitment. The person who prays is asking to bring about a practical action: this in itself is an act that shows involvement in practical life, which in turn directs the philosopher to actual moral perfection. Thus, in Maimonides’ philosophy there is no dichotomy between the contemplative life and petitionary prayer; rather, they complement each other.
Benor uses this to dismiss Alvin Reines’ argument that, in Maimonides’ eyes, contemplation had superseded petitionary prayer as a mode of worship for the philosopher. Benor maintains that, just as a philosopher can find use in petitionary prayer, a religious community could find use for sacrifices. Thus Maimonides did not consider petitionary prayer and sacrifices to be rendered obsolete or to have given way to contemplation; rather, they complemented each other and had differing roles in pursuing the same aim.[40]
By giving the above elaborate explanation of Maimonides’ view of prayer and especially by elucidating The Guide, III: 32, regarding sacrifices, prayer and contemplation, Benor argues convincingly that Maimonides’ system includes the need for petitionary prayer. In sum, Maimonides believed that petitionary prayer as discussed in The Code complements contemplative worship as discussed in The Guide.
Benor contends, however, that for Maimonides the primary utility of standardised daily prayer is the conscious awareness of standing before G-d. Sacrifices too had this purpose. By bringing a sacrifice, one becomes cognisant of G-d’s presence, i.e. that one is standing before G-d and worshipping Him. Prayer is therefore an act of worship that makes one aware of G-d presence.[41] Benor explains the dichotomy between scriptural prayer, which was not formalised in a set form of words, and rabbinic prayer, which was. Scriptural prayer was supposed to allow for a certain amount of individual expression. Each person was obliged to express his or her praise, petition and thanks to G-d. Those who were more eloquent and more philosophically aware would pray in a manner that was contemplative. This type of prayer suited all people and complemented the sacrifices that were offered up in the temple, adding an individualistic expression to worship at the temple.[42] When the temple ceased to exist people were no longer able to legitimately to speak to G-d in their own individual way. Instead they started to include in the prayers allusions arising from their imagination – something that Maimonides prohibits.[43] As a result, “men of the great synagogue” formalised prayer in a standard way.[44] But Benor reminds us that simply saying the standard form of the prayers is not the complete package. Just as sacrifices come together with an individual type of prayer that is often – for the philosopher – contemplative, rabbinic standardised prayer is also meant to give the person a sense of communal worship and of being in the presence of G-d. Hand in hand with that goes the meditative and contemplative worship that complements standard petitionary prayer
Thus, in summary I have argued that Benor’s compatibilist view of Maimonidean petitionary prayer and contemplative worship is convincing. According to Benor, Maimonides wanted the contemplative to study the structure of the universe and contemplate it and thereby come to a knowledge of G-d. Then on a daily basis the person has the opportunity to actually stand before G-d in petitionary prayer. Although Benor maintained that petitionary prayer enabled the philosopher to focus on the practical and therefore awaken the perfect moral action, this was apparently just a side benefit of prayer, the main purpose of which was that it gave the worshipper the sense of standing in G-d’s presence. For the philosopher, petitionary prayer also included an intellectual element – contemplation. We can thus conclude that Maimonides’ view of prayer is compatible with traditional religious practice and therefore can influence it.
What is not, however, clear from Benor’s analysis is the exact relationship between contemplation and petitionary prayer. How can one have an awareness of standing before G-d in prayer without prior contemplation of G-d? It seems from Benor that the actual petition is itself a form of contemplation.[45] Yet at the outset surely contemplation is needed in order to engender an awareness of standing before G-d in prayer.
In the next chapter I will argue that, according to Maimonides, a real conscious awareness of standing in the presence of God is only post-contemplative. Thus, before praying the contemplative contemplates all that s/he had comprehended regarding the natural structure of the universe and generates a conscious awareness of G-d’s presence. Once this has occurred the contemplative can start petitioning G-d in prayer. I will also show how the concept of having a conscious awareness of G-d during prayer is central to the Habad idea of prayer.
Part Two
The first thing that should be pointed out with regard to the connection between the Maimonidean and the Habad Hasidic approach to prayer is that, although they both have a strong contemplative ethos, nonetheless they both see great utility in petitionary prayer.
As with Benor’s concept of the Maimonidean approach, supplication, i.e., the actual mouthing of petitionary prayer, is deemed vital in Habad Hasidism. R. Shneur Zalman (the first Habad Rebbe, d. 1813) in Kuntrus Acharon[46] implores his followers to pray together in a group, saying word by word together with kavanah (intent). R. Shneur Zalman believed that at times it was fervent petitionary prayer that brought about devakut[47] – the Hasidic concept of cleaving to G-d. R. Dovber (the second Habad Rebbe, d. 1827) too demanded that his Hasidim pay attention to the Pirush ha-Milot – the literal meaning of the text.[48]
Benor’s view of Maimonides’ concept of prayer makes petitionary prayer the centrepiece of a person’s spiritual life. Habad see prayer in the same way, as R. Shneur Zalman states explicitly in Kuntrus Acharon:[49] “The main mode of worship [of G-d] during these near messianic times is prayer”. As we shall see in both the Maimonidean and the Habad concept, it is through prayer that the contemplative reaches a consciousness of the Creator. This awareness of G-d during prayer could be interpreted as a somewhat mystical type of experience. As we will see below, after contemplation one can reach a post-cognitive state of conscious awareness of G-d’s presence.[50] According to Benor’s reading of Maimonides, after comprehending the structure of the universe and thus attaining a knowledge of G-d, through prayer the philosopher enters a post-cognitive stage – an awareness of G-d. Indeed, David Blumenthal, in his introduction to an essay entitled “Maimonides’ Philosophical Mysticism”,[51] maintains that Maimonides was not just a rationalistic philosopher but also a mystic.
Blumenthal believes that Maimonides taught three stages of “True Spiritual Life”. The first stage is intellectual apprehension of G-d. The apprehension of G-d includes the study of natural sciences and the knowledge of G-d’s creations. Quoting The Code,[52] he maintains that, according to Maimonides, by studying natural sciences, “…the soul of such a person will thirst for G-d, and the flesh will yearn to love the omnipresent.”[53]
The second stage is intellectual contemplation of G-d. It is interesting that although Blumenthal does not associate this stage with petitionary prayer, he nonetheless sees this stage as the time one is made aware of being in G-d’s presence.
In this type of spirituality, one concentrates on abstract thinking, on pondering the most abstract and simple concepts. But, and this is crucial, as one does this, one places oneself in the presence of G-d. In intellectual contemplation, one ponders the highest metaphysical concepts and [his emphasis] one resides in the Divine presence.[54]
Blumenthal sees this as a mystical experience. Although Benor sees petitionary prayer itself as a form of contemplation, the telos of contemplation, i.e. bringing the contemplative to the love of G-d, means the same to both Benor and Blumenthal. They both talk about stage one – intellectual apprehension – followed by stage two – intellectual contemplation. Both agree that the contemplation should lead to an emotional love for G-d accompanied by a consciousness of G-d’s presence – a mystical experience. It seems, however, that what Benor leaves out Blumenthal adds in and vice versa. As noted above, Benor does not explicitly state that one needs actual contemplation before prayer in order to have an awareness of G-d’s presence during prayer. Blumenthal does make it explicit. By the same token, Blumenthal does not tell us that, according to Maimonides, petitionary prayer is compatible with this contemplative consciousness of G-d’s presence, whereas Benor does tell us this. Be that as it may, Maimonides considered that petitionary prayer is practised in a state of heightened conscious awareness of G-d’s presence and this can be interpreted to be a mystical experience.
Blumenthal further quotes Maimonides[55] saying that contemplation can be practised only after one has achieved the first stage, intellectual apprehension. He also sees the contemplation stage as more than an intellectual exercise; rather, a supreme mystical experience:
Intellectual effort alone is not enough; one must also make a spiritual, experiential effort if one wishes to attain to the telos of humanity.[56]
The third stage is the continuous contemplation of G-d, i.e. being constantly cognisant of G-d’s presence and having a continuous mystical experience. This is not discussed by Benor, and I therefore suggest that this is another instance in which Benor and Blumenthal complement each other. Quoting The Guide,[57] Blumenthal offers Maimonides’ view that continuous contemplation is “the end, the telos, of the person seeking perfection”.[58]
In summary, according to Blumenthal, there are three stages to human perfection:
- Understanding G-d through nature.
- Enjoying a mystical experience by contemplating abstract ideas.
- Constant contemplation and therefore constant mystical consciousness.
I will now demonstrate how the Habad view of prayer closely resembles the Maimonidean concept outlined above.
According to Roman Foxbrunner,[59] R. Shneur Zalman (the first Habad Rebbe) reasoned that after a person had studied the doctrine of unity in Sha’ar ha-Yihud ve-Emunah, s/he can, through the use of the contemplative methods found in Sefer shel Benonim, arouse the emotions to love and fear G-d. Foxbrunner then goes on to say that R. Shneur Zalman’s basic framework is clearly Maimonidean. Naftali Loewenthal, in his paper on Habad and Maimonides,[60] cites Foxbrunner and claims that although Foxbrunner lists a number of sources, he does not clarify what he means when attributing a Maimonidean framework to the Habad system.[61] Loewenthal[62] asserts that the Maimonidean framework found in R. Shneur Zalman can be understood in light of Blumenthal’s three stages, mentioned earlier. Chabad believes in a system of contemplation that involves three stages, starting with Hokhmah then Binah and finally Da’at, the acronym of which is Habad.
Loewenthal claims that Hokhmah is the point of cognition, which focuses on a theosophical idea, usually some kabbalistic concept, for example the idea that G-d created the world, and that its existence is wholly dependent on Him.[63] He understands Binah to be the process in which one contemplates the idea understood in Hokhmah, and this contemplation, according to Loewenthal, leads to emotions of either love of G-d or fear of G-d. Da’at “signifies a constant sense of attachment to the Divine. Da’at represents a further level at which the contemplation is concretised in the inner life of the person.”[64] Thus, Loewenthal[65] claims that these three stages correspond exactly with Blumenthal’s three Maimonidean stages. Hokhmah corresponds to intellectual apprehension, Binah to intellectual contemplation and Da’at to continuous intellectual contemplation. This, says Loewenthal, is the Maimonidean framework that Foxbrunner claims was behind R. Shneur Zalman’s system.
Although Loewenthal sheds light on the Maimonidean antecedents in R. Shneur Zalman’s system, his argument does not suffice. I would suggest that as well as possibly representing Loewenthal’s three levels of contemplation, Blumenthal’s three Maimonidean levels represent three levels of divine worship inherent in Habad. There are also other similarities that go beyond Blumenthal’s three levels.
The system that Habad uses to reach the telos of human perfection is strikingly similar to Maimonides’ system. As in Maimonides, in the Habad system the first stage is attaining an understanding of G-d. As Foxbrunner points out:
Love, fear, and the apprehension of G-d’s unity from which, ideally, they were to flow, are the foundations of R. Shneur Zalman’s conception of Service.[66]
In his paper on Maimonides and Habad, Loewenthal claims that the fundamental difference between the Maimonidean model and the Habad model is that Maimonides’ path to the knowledge of G-d is through the study of the natural sciences whereas the Habad approach to divine knowledge is through Kabbalistic truths. Thus, although R. Shneur Zalman quotes Maimonides’ presentation of divine cognition and knowledge saying that, “He is the one who knows, He is that which is known and He is knowledge itself”,[67] R. Shneur Zalman qualifies this by saying that the Kabbalists agreed with this idea of divine cognition.[68]
I contend that this is not because R. Shneur Zalman shunned anything philosophical, but rather because R. Shneur Zalman had a general policy of not using works that are based solely on human intellect, as he wrote in his introduction to the Tanya:
The books of piety which stem from human intelligence certainly do not have the same appeal for all people, for not all intellects and minds are alike, and the intellect of one man is not affected and excited by what affects and excites the intellect of another.[69]
R. Shneur Zalman in his Laws of the Study of Torah[70] makes a similar point. He recommends that one should study only books of piety (Musser) that are based on Midrash, Hagadah and sayings from the Zohar but not books that are based on human intellect. He therefore built his entire psycho-philosophy in the Sefer shel Benonim around intellectual speculation supported by Talmudic, Midrashic and Kabbalistic sayings rather than pure philosophic speculation alone.
Nevertheless, there is a similarity between the Habad approach to understanding G-d and the Maimonidean approach – Habad Hasidism also has a speculative nuance. The Zemah Zedek (the third Habad Rebbe, d. 1866), in his book Derekh Mitzvotekah.,[71]quotes Maimonides as saying that one must know G-d,[72] meaning that one must have an intellectual apprehension of G-d. Habad Hasidic literature often quotes the verse from Job 19:26, “From my flesh I see G-d”, and explains that through understanding one’s flesh, i.e. the physical world, one can come to an understanding of G-d. Benor portrays Maimonides’ concept of understanding G-d in a similar way. In other words, Habad and Maimonides both postulate the same vehicle to understanding G-d – through understanding nature – it is the framework that is used that is different. Maimonides uses pure human speculation as a guide for the understanding of nature, whereas Habad uses philosophical speculation that can be backed up by Kabbalistic and rabbinic traditions, both of which are deemed by tradition to be divinely inspired and therefore do not constitute pure intellectual speculation.
For this reason R. Shneur Zalman wrote Sha’ar ha-Yihud, which explains his theology. This work was meant to give the contemplative a Kabbalah-based philosophy through which s/he would be able to apprehend G-d. Only after attaining that apprehension did the contemplative start to contemplate – during and before prayer – on what had been understood. R. Shalom Dovber (the fifth Habad Rebbe, d. 1920) in his Tract on Prayer,states this explicitly:
For all prior study and knowledge [of Hasidic concepts] serve as a prelude to [achieving] the main [intention], which is the contemplation of these concepts during prayer in great detail.[73]
Contemplation is possible only when one has attained a sufficient knowledge of Hasidic thought. In later generations this was strictly enforced, as is demonstrated in a letter written by Rabbi Joseph Isaac Schneersohn (the sixth Habad Rebbe, d. 1950) relating how Rabbi Shalom Dovber reproached the spiritual guides of the Habad Yeshiva for allowing young students to immerse themselves in contemplation. He felt that their study of Hasidic theosophy was insufficient and forbade them to contemplate.[74] A similar sentiment is found in Rabbi Shalom Dovber’s Tract on Prayer:
But the youth who haven’t been exposed to much Chassidus and who are unfamiliar with the full breadth of its concepts, their reflection is only superficial, and absolutely cannot be considered genuine service. [In fact, their manner of reflection] is very far from being true avodah.[75]
This is strikingly similar to Maimonides’ view, found in The Guide, III: 51:
As for someone who thinks and frequently mentions G-d, without knowledge, following a mere imagining or following a belief adopted because of his reliance on the authority of somebody else, he is to my mind outside the habitation and far away from it and does not in true reality mention or think about G-d … This kind of worship ought only to be engaged in after intellectual conception has been achieved.[76]
Thus, according to both Maimonides’ system and the Habad system, contemplation should be engaged in only after proper apprehension of the subject matter of contemplation. In Blumenthal’s terms, one had to complete the first stage of intellectual apprehension before one could move on to the second stage of intellectual contemplation. Foxbrunner points out that in the Habad system the most appropriate time for one to engage in this sort of contemplation is during daily petitionary prayer.[77] This is also amply demonstrated by R. Shalom Dovber’s tract on prayer, which is almost completely devoted to dealing with methods of contemplating Hasidic ideas.
Thus, as in the Maimonidean system, in Habad Hasidism a vital component of petitionary prayer is contemplation. In fact, Habad Hasidism actually draws on Maimonides in The Codeto prove that contemplation goes hand in hand with petitionary prayer. The following is a quote from R. Menachem Mendel Shneersohn (the seventh Habad Rebbe, d. 1994):
And since the prayer is categorized as intent of the heart one needs preparation for it. “To empty one’s heart from all thoughts and see oneself as if one is standing before the divine presence” (Maimonides, The Code, Hilkhot Teffilah 4:16). And then during prayer one has to be in a mode of making [heartfelt] requests and supplications.[78]
Actual supplication, the mouthing of petitionary prayer, is deemed vital in Habad Hasidism, but it has to come together with awareness, brought about by contemplation, of standing before G-d. R. Shneur Zalman also expresses this in his Sefer shel Benonim:
And therefore one should serve Him with awe and fear as if he is standing before the King and one should contemplate at length on this thought to the extent of one’s mind’s capacity and in accordance with the time [available] to him … before donning tallit and tefilin [i.e. before prayer].[79]
This Maimonidean idea of having a heightened awareness of G-d during prayer is central to Habad’s concept of prayer. As Rachel Elior explains in her book The Paradoxical Ascent to G-d, the Kabbalistic Theosophy of Habad Hasidism,[80] in Habad Hasidism worship is all about the paradoxical dialect of Yesh and Ayin, i.e. being and nothingness.
Divine worship, according to Habad, is based on a dialectical theology that attributes two tendencies to divinity or two contradictory wills that are focused in the process of creation; the purpose of divine worship is to respond to the twofold dimension of the divinity: to annul the separate substance, to strip it of its materiality, and to elevate it in spiritual degrees until it is restored to the prior divine unity, on the one hand; and to draw down the divinity into the separate Yesh, to manifest it within the opposite of its essence, and to assist in the process of infusion of the Ayin into the Yesh, on the other hand.[81]
Thus, although on the one hand worship is supposed to bring G-dliness into the world, the worshipper must simultaneously try to see the world from a G-dly perspective, where the Yesh (something) is really negated by the Ayin (nothing). This is the process of self-abnegation that one is supposed to go through during prayer. Foxbrunner also explains the Habad concept of prayer in this manner.[82]
The concept of self-abnegation implies being subsumed in another being, in this case in G-d. Thus, the idea of conceptually turning the Yesh into Ayin during prayer really means having an acute awareness of G-d’s presence: when one is conscious of the Divine one can no longer feel oneself as a separate entity and conceptual self-annihilation occurs. The converse to this is that the abnegation of self leaves room for the Divine presence to manifest itself. This is the paradox Elior was talking about, in which, on the one hand, one has got rid of the Yesh through self-abnegation and, on the other, one has drawn down the Ayin, i.e. the Divine, into the Yesh, i.e. the universe. To achieve this one has to first undergo self-abnegation, meaning experiencing a heightened awareness of G-d. As with Benor’s concept of Maimonidean prayer, this is a fundamental aspect of prayer in the Habad system.
Thus, one must first apprehend G-d and then, before and during petitionary prayer, one should contemplate further on the concepts regarding G-d that one had previously apprehended. This contemplation in the Maimonidean system, according to Blumenthal, is supposed to bring the person to a mystical experience that is beyond any type of normal intellectual experience. Habad too sees the purpose of contemplation in this manner, as R. Shalom Dovber writes in his Tract on Prayer, as enabling one to achieve a type of cerebral ecstasy, in which a G-dly light shines in the contemplative’s mind, having an immediate and real effect on the heart and arousing emotions of love and fear:
When a person binds his mind with the divine core of the concept, then the G-dly light itself radiates in his mind. Although the light is still invested in intellective garments, these garments only act as a channel. The principle [aspect of the reflection], the G-dly light, is sensed by him. Therefore, the light is drawn and extends automatically into the heart as well. In other words, the essence of the G-dliness apprehended by his mind is also felt in his heart.[83]
This feeling of a G-dly light in one’s mind and the emotional love that is induced by contemplation seem to relate well with the mystical experience that Blumenthal is talking about in the second stage of his Maimonidean system.
Continuous contemplation – in which the contemplative constantly senses this mystical feeling even when he is carrying out mundane chores – is the third and ultimate Maimonidean stage that Blumenthal discusses. This stage too is found within the Habad system.[84] Although to maintain such a level of intensity would not come naturally to most people, we shall see that, it is nonetheless something to be aimed for.
In Habad Hasidism, most people can reach only the level of the Benoni (lit. intermediary person). A Benoni usually has a mystical experience during and immediately after prayer only. As R. Shneur Zalman says in Sefer shel Benonim:
A Benoni is likened to a person that is asleep but can awaken from his sleep. Similarly the evil which is in the Benoni is as if asleep in the left side [of his heart] during the time of the recital of the Shema and prayer when his heart is burning with love of G-d, but after this [the evil] can reawaken itself.[85]
R. Shneur Zalman then goes on to say that because there are times when the Benoni feels no love for G-d in his heart, his service cannot be considered true service. Only a Zaddik who has already conquered his evil inclination and therefore has nothing to replace and dispel the love s/he has for G-d can experience a continuous love for G-d.[86]
Loewenthal, writing of the difference between the Zaddik and the Benoni in R. Shneur Zalman’s system, makes exactly this distinction:
The difference between the Zaddik and the Benoni in this ecstasy is that for the latter this state is not permanent; the “evil” (i.e. the ordinary animal self of the non-Zaddik) reawakens once he leaves the heightened atmosphere of ecstatic prayer … The Benoni undergoes the experience of abnegation during prayer. Afterwards his “normal” self returns, manifested by the activity of his normal will. He is not a Zaddik, for a Zaddik reaches a permanent abnegation …[87]
Nonetheless, as Loewenthal points out,[88] there are Benonis who do feel continuous abnegation, which is synonymous with a constant awareness of the Divine. This happens when a Benoni occupies himself with constant contemplation. Because this type of Benoni is in a constant mystical state, the Benoni can mistakenly think that s/he has reached the level of a Zaddik. This can also happen the opposite way round: a Zaddik can mistake him- or herself for a Benoni who constantly contemplates. As Loewenthal writes:
He [R. Shneur Zalman] states that the Talmudic sage Rabbah, who was really a Zaddik, considered himself a Benoni who prayed all day long and was therefore in a continuous state of ecstasy.[89]
Thus, the ultimate level that a Benoni can reach, in the Habad system, is the Benoni who prays, i.e. contemplates, all day long. Such a Benoni will be in a constant state of divine awareness. This mystical consciousness will be with the Benoni even when s/he is involved with mundane issues such as eating and sleeping. We have thus shown how Maimonides’ third and highest level – according to Blumenthal – is consistent with the highest level in the Habad system. In that system, as noted before, it is superficially difficult to differentiate between the Benoni and the Zaddik.
Summary
I have shown that the compatibilist view regarding Maimonides’ view on prayer is not only sustainable but has also influenced traditional religious practice. Using Benor’s and Blumenthal’s analysis of Maimonides, I have shown how the Maimonidean system of worship and prayer has been adopted as traditional practice in the Habad Hasidic system. Thus, although some scholars saw Maimonides’ system of contemplation found in The Guide as incompatible with traditional religious practice, it is nonetheless today, nearly eighteen hundred years after its inception, an integral part of Habad Hasidic thought. The contemplative elements within Maimonides’ system are mirrored almost exactly in the system expounded by the first Habad Rebbe, R. Shneur Zalman. Later generations of Habad leaders expanded on the Maimonidean element, as is demonstrated by R. Dovber’s aversion to contemplation by young inexperienced Hasidim who lacked proper knowledge of Hasidic thought – a decidedly Maimonidean attitude.
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[1] See footnote 11 for examples of this view.
[2] In Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel (eds), Maimonides and Philosophy: Papers Presented at the Sixth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, May 1985 (Boston, 1986).
[3] Philadelphia, 1976.
[4] New York, 1995.
[5] See David Blumenthal, “Maimonides’ Philosophic Mysticism”, H-emory. H-edu.
[6] Guide, I: 56, 130–1. All translations of The Guide are taken from Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed,Shlomo Pines trans. (Chicago, 1963).
[7] Ibid., I: 52, 115.
[8] Ibid., III: 16, 463.
[9] Reines, “Maimonides’ True Belief”, 25.
[10] The Guide, III: 32, 526.
[11] Reines, “True Belief”, 32. David Hartman, Torah and Philosophy, 161–6, sees this paragraph as consistent with Maimonides’ view of the commandments and the importance of the historical context of the commandments. According to Hartman, Maimonides identifies three historical levels in the quest of the Jewish people to get to know G-d. The first is biblical, the second is rabbinic and the third is messianic. The main concern during the biblical period was the uprooting of idolatry. During the rabbinic period the quest was to combat the cynicism that the suffering of exile brings. The messianic period is primarily concerned with loving G-d. The three levels of worship – sacrifices, petitionary prayer and contemplative worship – relate to these three historical levels. Hartman maintains that, just as sacrifices were complemented by verbal prayer, similarly Maimonides in The Guide maintains that petitionary prayer should be complemented by silent meditative, contemplative worship.
[12] This incompatibilist view is also held regarding Maimonides’ work in general, i.e. the relationship between his philosophical work, The Guide,and his halachic work, The Code. Isaac Husik in A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1944), for example, is firmly of the opinion that speculative philosophy and Torah law are incompatible. Husik maintains that the biblical definition of wisdom is at odds with the philosophical definition and therefore philosophical speculation cannot be successfully applied to biblical law. Husik maintains, however, that Maimonides himself was unaware of this incompatibility:
Maimonides is an Aristotelian, and he endeavours to harmonize the intellectualism and theorism of the Stagirite with diametrically opposed ethics and religion of the Hebrew bible. And he is apparently unaware of the yawning gulf extending between them. No stress is laid upon knowledge and theoretical speculation as such. The wisdom and the wise man of the book of Proverbs no more mean the theoretical philosopher than the fool and the scorner in the same book denote the one ignorant in theoretical speculation. “The beginning of wisdom is fear of the L-rd.” This is keynote to the book of proverbs, and its precepts and exhortations are practical and nothing else. (Husik, A History, 300)
Thus, Husik is surprised that a sage of Maimonides’ magnitude should make such a huge misjudgement in attempting to explain religious law with philosophical speculation. For a more complex incompatibilist view, see Leo Strauss in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago, 1988), 86–7 and Harman in Torah and Philosophy, 22–7.
[13] Chicago, 1990.
[14] Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, 312.
[15] Ibid., 317.
[16] Benor (Worship, 68) terms it as such.
[17] The Guide, III: 44, 574.
[18] Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, 321.
[19] Fox’s view is an example of an integrationist view of the relationship between Maimonides’ philosophical work and his halachic works. David Hartman (ibid., 26) brings the different views in this regard. Hartman himself argues that Maimonides successfully integrated traditional Torah law with his philosophical ideas. (See and above footnote 7.)
[20] Surry, 1997, Chapter 9, “Morality, Law and Explanation”, 129–61, discusses Maimonides’ view on prayer.
[21] Leaman, Moses, 140–1.
[22] Ibid., 142.
[23] Ibid., 153–4.
[24] Ibid., 152.
[25] The Guide, III: 54, 638. Leaman, ibid., 154.
[26] See Leaman, Moses, 158.
[27] See ibid., 161. Hartman’s argument (Torah and Philosophy, 176–83) is similar to this. He asks: if the laws of sacrifices, for example, were implemented to inculcate correct opinions and combat idolatry, then now having overcome our idolatrous inclinations, the need for sacrifices should be obsolete, so why not abolish the law of sacrifices? After arguing that Maimonides was concerned about the integrity of the law, Hartman (ibid., 183; quoted below) goes on to say that it is important that the laws not be changed because the human potential to revert back to idol worship is ever-present:
Jews must not succumb to the illusion that they have transcended the need for halakhah – for a structure of behaviour, which supports their understanding of G-d. It was the law which weaned men away from paganism, but this “weaning” is not a necessary process of history. By maintaining the laws of sacrifices, the Jew might be reminded of his human vulnerability to paganism. Thus, ample room exists for legitimising halakhic practices whose legislative rationale is no longer operative.
[28] See Leaman, Moses, 141.
[29] See Benor, Worship, 22.
[30] Ibid., 26.
[31] Ibid., 31, 38.
[32] Leaman, Moses, 152.
[33] See The Guide, I: 68, 163.
[34] See ibid., 164.
[35] Benor, Worship, 38.
[36] What Benor really seems to be saying here is that Maimonides’ “absolute transcendence” view of the deity has to be tempered somewhat. This was Shlomo Pines’ dilemma: (“The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”, The Guide of the Perplexed, Chicago, 1963, xcviii): when he pointed out that Maimonides by way of analogy at least, had related G-d’s intellect to human intellect and in doing this he was contradicting his radical negative attribute theology:
Obviously this view runs counter to negative theology. It may be recalled in this connection that in his Introduction to The Guide,Maimonides states that, for reasons he presents, he deliberately inserted into his work contradictory theses (one false, one correct).
Thus, Shlomo Pines asks:
Is this an instance of this didactic method, and if so, which is his real doctrine?
Benor seems to imply that this is indeed an instance of the didactic method and in view of this Maimonides’ radical negative attributes theology has to be qualified.
[37] See The Guide,1: 54, 123 and Benor, ibid., 44.
[38] See Benor, Worship, 47.
[39] Ibid., 60.
[40] Ibid., 76.
[41] Ibid., 76–9.
[42] Ibid., 97–8.
[43] See The Guide, I: 59, 141–2.
[44] See Benor, Worship, 102–6.
[45] See ibid., 98.
[46] New York, 1992, 162b.
[47] See Roman Foxbrunner, The Hasidism of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady (Alabama, 1992), 191.
[48] See Naftali Loewenthal, “Habad Approaches to Contemplative Prayer”, in Ada Rapoport-Albert (ed.), Hasidism Reappraised (London, 1997), 297. This is somewhat different from the way in which prayer was perceived in early Hasidism, where the literal meaning of the words of the prayer was sidelined. Joseph Weiss (“The Kavvanoth of Prayer in Early Hasidism”, in Studies in Eastern European Jewish Mysticism, London, 1997, 104) states that Israel Baalshem (1698–1760) used a technique for prayer called “attachment of oneself to the letters”. This technique consisted of gazing at each letter. Weiss points out that:
In this atomization the literal meaning of the sentence evaporates and the letters that constitute the words and sentences … become meaningless.
The Great Maggid (1700–1772) also spoke of having great attachment (hitkashrut) to the words of the prayers; however, he does not mention thinking about the literal meaning of the words of petitionary prayers (see ibid., 106–7).
It seems that in early Hasidism one was not supposed, during prayer, to think at all about asking G-d to satisfy one’s physical needs; rather, devakut was the sole purpose of prayer. One sees an emphasis on the simple meaning of the petitionary prayer only in the Habad School, starting from Rabbi Shneur Zalman.
[49] 162a.
[50] For greater elaboration on this post-cognitive state in Maimonidean thought see David Blumenthal, “Maimonides, Prayer, Worship and Mysticism”, H-emory, H-edu.
[51] For further reading on Maimonides and Mysticism see Moshe Idel, The Mystical Experience in Abraham Abulafia (New York, 1988) and Moshe Idel, “Maimonides and Kabbalah”, in Isador Twersky (ed.), Studies in Maimonides (London, 1991).
[52] The Code, “Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah”, 2:2 and 4:12.
[53] Ibid., 4: 12.
[54] Blumenthal, “Philosophical Mysticism”, H-emory, H-edu, Chapter one, “The Second Stage”. See also Blumenthal, “Maimonides, Prayer” ibid.
[55] The Guide, 3: 51. Loewenthal, in an unpublished paper entitled “The Image of Maimonides in Habad Hasidism” (given at a Maimonidean conference held at University College London in June 2004), points out that, according to Joseph Weiss (Studies, 39, n. 3) and Louis Jacobs (Hasidic Prayer, London, 1972,72), The Guide, III: 51 is the source for the Hasidic idea of devakut. The ultimate level of devakut, in Hasidic thought, is not just a temporary mystical cleaving to G-d but a constant feeling of closeness to G-d that manifests itself in every aspect of a person’s life, including eating and drinking and talking with people. See The Guide, 623 of thePines translation.See also The Code, “Hilkhot Teshuva”, 10:3:
What is appropriate love? This is an extremely strong and profound love of G-d, such that one’s soul is committed to the love of G-d and that one will be so preoccupied with it that one will appear to be lovesick. It is [similar to] one in which one’s mind is perpetually occupied at all times with a particular woman. The thought of her fills his heart at all times, when sitting down, when rising up, when he is eating or drinking. Even more intense than this shall be the love of G-d in the heart of those who love Him; it should be continuous.
[56] Blumenthal, “Philosophical Mysticism”.
[57] Ibid.
[58] See Blumenthal, “Philosophical Mysticism”: The Third Stage.
[59] The Hasidism, ibid.
[60] “The Image of Maimonides in Habad Hasidism”, see above, n. 50.
[61] Foxbrunner, in The Hasidism, 282, n. 5, quotes The Code, “Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah”2: 1-2, “Hilkhot Teshuva”, 10 and The Guide, I: 39, III: 28, 44 and especially 51, all of which talk about the need to have intellectual apprehension and contemplation of G-d before one can attain an emotion of love for G-d. It seems clear that this is the framework Foxbrunner is referring to. In Sefer shel Benonim (New York, 1992), R. Shneur Zalman uses exactly this framework when talking about the need first to apprehend and contemplate in order to arouse an emotion of love and fear. See his chapters 16, 41, 42, 43 and 46 for examples of this doctrine.
[62] “The Image of Maimonides”.
[63] Interestingly, this is an idea that according to Benor (Worship, 115) should be contemplated during prayer.
[64] It seems that not all scholars agree with Loewenthal’s definition of Binah and Da’at (see above). Nissan Mindel in his book The Philosophy of Chabad (Vol. II, New York, 1985, 33) describes Binah:
Binah refers to the cognitive faculty, where the idea is analysed, and Da’at represents the final state in the mental process, where the idea attains its most definite comprehension, which, in turn gives rise to corresponding emotions and feelings.
If Binah does not result in emotion it would not accurately correspond to Blumenthal’s second Maimonidean stage, which includes feelings of love and fear for G-d. Loewenthal is, however, consistent in his understanding of Binah and Da’at. In his book Communicating the Infinite, The Emergence of the Habad School(Chicago, 1990, 75–6), he explains Hokhmah, Binah and Da’at in a similar manner.
Moshe Hallamish in his doctoral thesis “The Theoretical System of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liady” (unpublished thesis, 1976,) 85 argues that intellect can make the transition into emotion only through the lower level of Da’at entitled Da’at Takhton, thus supporting Nissan Mindel’s assertion.
Rabbi Shalom Dovber Schneersohn, in his Tract on Ecstasy (Y. Eliezer Danziger trans., New York, 1992, chapters 4 and 5, 21–31), dismisses as inauthentic any emotion that is not connected with Da’at. He sees Da’at as the intermediary between the intellect and the emotions; thus real emotions can be aroused only by Da’at. Based on this, I would say that Loewenthal’s comparison between Hokhmah, Binah and Da’at and Blumenthal’s three Maimonidean levels needs greater elaboration.
[65] “The Image of Maimonides”.
[66] Foxbrunner, The Hasidism, 178.
[67] The Code,“Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah”, 2:1, Hilkhot Teshuva, 5:5, Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 8 and The Guide, I: 68. See also Sefer shel Benonim, Chapters 2:6a, 4: 8b, 42: 60a, 48: 68b; and R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi, Sha’ar ha-Yihud ve-Emunah (New York, 1992), chapter 7: 83a.
[68] According toMordechai Taitlebaum in ha-Rav mi-Liadi u-Mifleget Chabad (Warsaw, 1913), vol. 2, 20, in order not to antagonise his detractors within the Hasidic movement R. Shneur Zalman supported any philosophical argument with Kabbalistic sources.
[69] Introduction to Sefer shel Benonim, 3b.
[70] Chapter 2: 9 and chapter 3: 4.
[71] See Derekh Mitzvotekah (New York, 1991), 44b. See also R. Menachem Mendel Shneersohn, Sha’arai Emunah (Jerusalem, 1991), 21–45.
[72] The Code,“Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah”, 1:1.
[73] Tract on Prayer.ibid., Chapter 2, 16. This is strikingly similar to how Blumenthal understands Maimonides’ view on the utility of philosophy:
The telos according to Maimonides, is not philosophy itself. Philosophy is a stage, an instrument, a means to an end. The end is continuous contemplation of G-d. (Blumenthal, “Philosophical Mysticism”)
[74] See R. J. I. Schneersohn, Iggeret Kodesh (New York, 1982), 193–4.
[75] Tract on Prayer, 20–1.
[76] The Guide. ibid., 620.
[77] See Foxbrunner The Hasidism. 186 and Hallamish ibid., 283.
[78] Quoted in Joseph Alperovits (ed.), Ohr ha-Tefilah (New York, 1994), vol. 4, 12.
[79] Sefer shel Benonim, chapter 41, 56b. My own translation.
[80] New York, 1993.
[81] Elior, The Paradoxical Ascent, 131.
[82] See Foxbrunner, The Hasidism, 187. Although one can argue, as has Joseph Weiss (“Contemplative Mysticism and ‘Faith’ in Hasidic Piety”, in Studies in Eastern European Jewish Mysticism (1953), 50–1), that included in this self-annihilation is the need to disregard one’s personal needs. This would diminish the concept of petitionary prayer. However, as noted above, Habad attached great importance to petitionary prayer.
[83] Tract on Prayer, chapter 6, 33. This does not seem compatible with what Loewenthal (Communicating, 76–7) quotes from R. Shneur Zalman regarding a type of contemplation that precipitates a cerebral ecstasy that is so deeply intellectual as to lead to a state in which the “soul seems to transcend the limitations of the body”. This ecstasy is induced by the intellect and takes place in the mind and is so intense that it does not lead to heartfelt emotion.
[84] See Foxbrunner, ibid., 21–2, who also makes the connection between Maimonides’ highest level and Hasidism’s ultimate level.
[85] Sefer shel Benonim, chapter 13, 19a. My own translation.
[86] As stated above, Loewenthal compared this third level to the idea of Da’at. However, the ultimate level of Da’at, in which the person constantly experiences a love for G-d, even when involved with mundane matters, is chiefly the realm of the elite Zaddik and not the Benoni. See Jacob Immanuel Schochet in his Chassidic Dimensions, vol. 3 (121), where he says:
The true Zaddik is an altogether holy personality; the personification of “Let all your deeds be for the sake of heaven”. He personifies the ideal of “Know Him in all your ways” (Proverbs 3:6): “de’eihu (know Him [from the word da’at – my addition]) is a word signifying attachment.
Schochet, however, admits that the Habad system encourages every person to aspire to this level.
[87] See Loewenthal, Communicating, 58–9.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Communicating, 59.